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Abstract
The present note shows that ”innocuous” Minimum Quality Standards, namely
standards that are below the lowest quality level observed in the market, may
have eﬀects on equilibrium outcomes. In particular this is true in a duopoly
where one high quality firm invests in R&D to lower its cost of quality improve-
ments. A Standard that is below, but close to, the lowest quality observed in
the market reduces the incentive to invest by the quality leading firm.
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1. Introduction
The role of Minimum Quality Standards (MQS) as a regulatory instrument has re-
ceived so far little attention in the theory of oligopoly competition. Starting with
Ronnen (1991), however, a small number of papers (see, for instance, Crampes and
Hollander 1995, Scarpa 1998) have analyzed the eﬀects of MQS in situations where
firms produce, before the introduction of the standard, diﬀerent qualities of a prod-
uct. Then, usually, the analysis is confined to standards that lie between the lowest
and the highest quality in the market and that force low quality firms to a higher
quality. The models in the literature almost always build upon the vertical diﬀerenti-
ation models of Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and Shaked and Sutton (1981) So far,
in no place in the literature, has even been mentioned the possibility that standards
that lie below the lowest quality in the market may have any impact on the industry
outcome. In what follows I shall term these standards as ”innocuous standards”, due
to their unintrusive appearance, although indeed I shall show precisely that they may
not be innocuous at all. In particular, in a duopoly, if the leading firm is assumed to
be able to invest resources in cost reducing technologies, then an innocuous MQS may
lead to lower investment of this sort than it would result in an unregulated industry.
The example I use is a variant of Garella (2003) with a duopoly where firms produce
products that are diﬀerentiated both, horizontally and vertically. Furthermore, firms
diﬀer in their ability to improve upon the vertical dimension of their products quality,
so that at an unregulated equilibrium the two qualities are not identical. In a diﬀerent
context, of a political economy game, it has been stressed the role of firms acting as
quality leaders in industries (Lutz, Lion and Maxwell (2000). In the present paper, by
contrast, quality leaders do not play a game with the regulatory authorities, but have
the role of spurring quality innovation1. The quality leader, in particular, is assumed
to be able to reduce the fixed cost of quality, while the other firm is not able to do so.
This is an extreme case of asymmetry in R&D abilities. A much more general case
would be obtained if both firms could invest in R&D albeit with diﬀerent abilities.
Unfortunately, this case proves algebraically irksome and would become tractable only
at the cost of special assumptions on the relation between R&D investment and cost
reduction (thereby loosing in generality).
The model below is a modified Hotelling (1929) linear city of unit length, where
two firms are located at the two opposite endpoints of the spectrum of horizontal
characteristics. The vertical dimension is represented by a one-to-one relation between
a parameter, θi, and the gross consumers’ surplus from the purchase of product i. The
basic game played by the two firms in the absence of regulation and of investments in
new technologies is the following. At the first stage both firms choose their qualities.
At the second and final stage they select prices. This game is analyzed only in order
to have the background on which to sketch the main argument and it contains no
new insights. When the possibility of introducing regulation is added to the set-up, a
regulator is called to decide whether to use or not a MQS, based upon the observed
qualities, as after an investigation by experts. If the regulator introduces a MQS
then both firms must abide and cannot lower their quality below the standard. The
modified game played is the following. Firms inherit their qualities from the situation
with no R&D investment and no regulation. At stage 0, the regulator’s choice is
restricted to a binary choice, for the sake of the argument: it can either set a MQS
equal to the lowest produced quality (innocuous standard) or no MQS at all. At the
stage 1 Firm 1 invests in R&D, while firm 2 invests zero. Then the second and third
stages parallel those of the basic game. A comparison between the decision to leave
the industry with no standard and that of introducing an innocuous standard reveals
that with no standard the investment in R&D by the high quality firm is higher than
with the standard.
2. Unregulated industry equilibrium
There are two firms, indexed 1 and 2. Products are horizontally diﬀerentiated and,
by hypothesis, the two firms are located at the opposite endpoints of a Hotelling
linear city (Hotelling 1929). Each product embodies a vertical quality dimension, θ,
which is costly to obtain. Firms are asymmetric, in the sense that firm 1 is assumed
to be more eﬃcient than firm 2 in improving the vertical dimension of its quality. The
production cost for the quantity of output q1 for firm 1 is C1(q1, θ1) = cq1 + θ
2
1/2,
where c > 0 is a constant marginal cost independent of θ. The cost for firm 2 is
C2(q2, θ2) = cq2 + αθ
2
2/2, where α > 1 is a cost parameter for firm 2. The quality θ
1Other policy-oriented papers are Ecchia and Lambertini (1997) and Boom (1995).
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only aﬀects fixed costs.
Consumers have an address x ∈ [0, 1], and the distribution of consumers is uniform
with unit density. When buying at location i− 1, for i = 1, 2, a consumer obtains a
lower utility than if it was buying her own preferred brand. This transportation cost
is t |x− (i− 1)|, where |·| denotes absolute value and t is a parameter. Then, given
the prices p1 and p2, the utility derived from consumption of one unit good 1 and 2 is
ui(x, θi) = v + θi − t |x− (i− 1)|− pi, for i = 1, 2. (2.1)
The basic game without regulation and without R&D opportunities is a two stage
game. At the first stage firms simultaneously choose their quality levels θ1 and θ2;
at the second and final stage firms simultaneously choose their prices. It is assumed
that t is high enough, or
Assumption 1. t > 2/9.
Furthermore, it shall be assumed that v is large enough so that the market is
always entirely served.
Assumption 2. v > 2t+ c.
The address, x˜, of the consumer for which u1(x, θ1) = u2(x, θ2) holds is:
x˜(p1, p2; θ1, θ2) = max
½
0,min
½
1,
1
2
+
(p2 − p1) + (θ1 − θ2)
2t
¾¾
. (2.2)
Accordingly, the demand functions at the second stage of the game are defined as
D1(p1, p2; θ1, θ2) = x˜ and D2(p1, p2; θ1, θ2) = 1 − x˜. Then, when x˜(p1, p2; θ1, θ2) is
not equal to either 0 or 1, the profit maximization problem for firm 1 at the second
stage can be written as
max
p1
(p1 − c)
∙
1
2
+
(p2 − p1) + (θ1 − θ2)
2t
¸
− θ
2
1
2
.
This provides the best reply function for firm 1 and 2 at the second stage
pˇi(pj) = max
∙
pj
2
+
(θi − θj) + t+ c
2
, 0
¸
, for i, j = 1, 2 ; i 6= j. (2.3)
One can show that if θ2 ≤ θ1 − 3(t + c) ≡ θ02, then firm 2 is priced out of the
market and the equilibrium prices are p2 = 0, and p1 = pm1 , where p
m
1 is the monopoly
price for firm 1. Similarly, if the quality of firm 1 is too low this firm would be priced
out2. We shall exclude that either firm uses a quality so low as to be priced out, so
that the analysis of the case where θ2 ≤ θ02 (or θ1 ≤ θ01) shall not be further pursued.
The study of a game where either firm can use a high quality policy so as to gain
monopoly power is out of the scope of the present work.
Then, it easy to calculate the Nash equilibrium prices, p∗1 and p
∗
2, at the second
stage, as:
p∗i (θ1, θ2) = t+ c+ (−1)i−1 [(θ1 − θ2)/3] , for i = 1, 2. (2.4)
2Namely if θ1 is lower or equal to θ2 − 3(t+ c) ≡ θ01.
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Notice that p∗1(θ1, θ2)−p∗2(θ1, θ2) = (2/3)(θ1−θ2) is positive if the quality of firm
1 is higher than that of firm 2.
Now, solving3 for the values of θ1 and θ2 at the first stage one gets the following
best reply functions in terms of qualities,
θ1(θ2) =
3t− θ2
9t− 1 , θ2(θ1) = max
½
3t− θ1
9αt− 1 , θ1 − 3(t+ c)
¾
. (2.5)
θ1
θ2
O
θ2(θ1)
θ1(θ2)
Figure 1: quality best replies
3t
3t(9αt-1)-1
3t(9t-1)-1
Vertical qualities are strategic substitutes. Note that firm 2 cannot choose a
quality lower than θ1− 3(t+ c) otherwise it is priced out of the market at the second
stage, this explains the V-shape of its best reply function (obviously also the best
3The equilibrium demand functions are D∗i (θ1, θ2) = (1/2) + (−1)(i−1) [(θ1 − θ2)/(6t)], for i =
1, 2. The reduced form profits, that shall be used to solve the first stage of the game, are π∗i (θ1, θ2) =h
3t+(−1)(i−1)(θ1−θ2)
i2
18t
− (θ1)
2
2
.
4
reply of firm 1 is V-shaped if α is not too large, but the best replies are defined so as
so as to simply the exposition). If the best reply functions cross where they are both
downward sloping then both firms shall enjoy a positive market share at equilibrium,
with positive prices (irrespective of profits). One obtains, then, the Nash equilibrium
values for the qualities of the two firms as,
θ∗1 =
9αt− 2
3(9αt− α− 1) ; θ
∗
2 =
9t− 2
3(9αt− α− 1) . (2.6)
The assumptions that t > 2/9 (A.1) and α > 1 together imply that θ∗2 > 0 holds
4.
Prices and demands at equilibrium, for i = 1, 2, are
p∗i = t+ c+ (−1)i−1
µ
t(α− 1)
9αt− α− 1
¶
, D∗i =
1
2
+ (−1)i−1
µ
α− 1
2 (9αt− α− 1)
¶
(2.7)
It is possible that if t is too high, then the intervals defining the market shares of the
two firms do not touch and firms behave as separate monopolists. To exclude this
possibility it is assumed that even for consumer with address x = 0 one has u2 > 0 at
an equilibrium. This is true if the inequality v+θ∗2−p∗2 > t holds, which is guaranteed
by A.2, as it can be easily checked.
Further, it can be checked that D∗2 > 0 and that p
∗
2 > 0 for t > 2/9. Therefore,
under the assumption that t ≥ 2/9 the best reply function in qualities of the two
firms cross where they are both downward sloping. The equilibrium demand for firm
2, which can also be written as α(9t− 2)/(9αt− α− 1), is positive for α > 1.
The equilibrium profits for the unregulated industry are,
πu1 =
µ
9t− 1
18
¶µ
9αt− 2
9αt− α− 1
¶2
and πu2 = α
µ
9t− 1
18
¶µ
9t− 2
9αt− α− 1
¶2
(2.8)
Both profits are nonnegative and that of firm 1 is always larger than that of firm 2.
3. Innocuous Standards and Incentives to Invest
Given a historically determined equilibrium situation the regulator can set a Minimum
Quality Standard, defined by the real number Θ. For the sake of the argument, the
regulator’s choice is assumed to be restricted such that either Θ = θ∗2 (an ”innocuous
standard”) or Θ = 0, no standard. Note that under the assumptions 1, 2 and α > 1,
The regulator’s decision is taken at stage ”0” of the regulation game, given θ2 = θ
∗
2
as given by (2.6).
Suppose that the cost function of firm 1 can be modified by some R&D investment.
At stage 1, of the regulation game, that is, firm 1 can invest the sum x, so as to reduce
the cost of quality improvement. Firm 2 cannot invest, as a simplifying assumption.
4Note, again, that it is implicitly assumed that α is not so large as to allow monopolization by
firm 1.
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It shall be assumed in particular, C1(q, θ1, d) = cq + g(x) [θ]
2 /2 + x. In other
terms, investing x ≥ 0 in money terms, provides a reduction in the fixed cost of
producing quality θ according to the function g(x), where: g0(x) < 0 and g00(x) < 0,
for all x ≥ 0, and g(0) = 1.
In terms of the reaction functions in Figure 1 above, an increase in x leads to an
outward rotation of the reaction function θ1(θ2), with the point (0, 3t) on the vertical
axis, as a pivot.
Under no regulation, namely with Θ = 0, the maximization problem of firm 1 at
the quality choice stage is rewritten as
max
θ1
[3t+ (θ1 − θ2)]2
18t
− g(x) [θ1]
2
2
− x. (3.1)
This leads to the following best reply function for firm 1
θ1 =
3t− θ2
9g(x)t− 1 . (3.2)
This best reply is clearly increasing in x, given the assumptions on g(x). Recalling
that the best reply function of firm 2 is θ2(θ1) = (3t − θ1)/ (9αt− 1), if there is no
standard, the Nash solutions in terms of qualities, denoted by θ0i , are
θ01 =
9αt− 2
3 (9αtg(x)− α− g(x)) and θ
0
2 =
9gt− 2
3 (9αtg(x)− α− g(x)) . (3.3)
Notice that when g = 1, namely when x = 0, the values of θg1 and θ2 coincide with θ
∗
1
and θ∗2 of section 2 above.
Without a standard, firm 2 would lower its quality5 with respect to θu2 , that is,
one obtains the inequality: θ02 < θ
u
2 , implying that a lower g leads to a lower value
for θ2 at equilibrium.
Analyzing now the choice of the R&D investment by firm 1, one can write the
program for this firm as
max
x
π(x) =
[3t+ (θ1(x)− θ2)]2
18t
− g(x) [θ1(d)]
2
2
− x. (3.4)
It is apparent that the marginal net return to invest in a reduction in cost g(x),
decreases with θ2. Therefore, since θ2 is forced to remain at its pre-standard equilib-
rium level, firm 1 will invest less in R&D when a standard is imposed than without
it.
Formally, one can state the following result.
Proposition 1. Provided the function π(x) is concave, in a game where a MQS equal
to the lowest quality in the market prevails the level of cost-reducing R&D investment,
x, by the high quality firm 1 is lower than in a game where there is no standard.
5This can be seen observing that
dθ02
dg
=
9αt− 2
3 (9αtg − α− g)2
> 0 under the assumptions on t and
α.
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Proof: Let π(x) = [3t+ (θ1(x)− θ∗2)]
2
/(18t)−(g(x)/2) [θ1(x)]2−x. Furthermore, let
θ0(x) denote the derivative of θ1(x) with respect to x. Note first that θ0(x) is positive
for x ≥ 0. Then the first order condition for a maximum of π(x) is π0(x) = 0, where
π0(x) = θ01(x) [(3t+ θ1 − θ∗2)/(9t)]−g0(x) [θ1(x)]
2 (1/2)−g(x)θ01(x). The second order
condition, under the hypothesis that π(x) is concave, implies that π00(x) < 0 where
π00(x) =
θ001(x)
9t
(3t + θ1 − θ∗2) +
£
θ01(x)
¤2
9t
− g00(x) [θ1(x)]
2
2 − 2g0(x)θ
0
1(x) − g(x)θ001(x).
Then, diﬀerentiating the first order condition with respect to θ∗2 and to x gives
dx
dθ∗2
=
θ01(x)
π00(x)
< 0, for x ≥ 0,
which completes the proof.
The incentive to invest for firm 1 is reduced if a MQS is introduced, this implies
that regulation may become an obstacle to quality improvements that would have
occurred over time by the leading firm. By continuity arguments, a MQS that lies
slightly below the lowest quality level has the same eﬀects.
4. Conclusion
The idea that Minimum Quality Standards that lie below the minimum produced
quality bear eﬀects on the industry outcome is the only issue of the present note. In
particular, there is no clear indication here that a MQS be a ”wrong” policy, since
the optimal level of R&D from the social point of view is not discussed here. Such
an analysis requires a more general model than what has been used above. The main
result, therefore, has to be interpreted as a counter-example rather than as an attempt
to derive general insights. More work is needed to assess the eﬀects of MQS when
R&D investments are available. This is a topic that may become more and more
relevant as regulation in hi-tech and in information technology industries is increased.
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